De Waal and Khan (2025) argue that IHL enforcement struggles in Israel–Gaza, where legal norms collide with asymmetric warfare. Deterrence theory suggests perceived intent is central to threat assessment (Tu et al., 2024), and high-stakes environments often intensify escalation risks (Danilović, 2010). This project asks: do IHL allegations and enforcement actions dampen violence by increasing restraint, or do they escalate conflict by reinforcing hostile intent narratives and hardening domestic resolve? We combine text-as-data analyses of securitizing speech (leaders, media), codings of IHL allegation events, and conflict intensity series, using time-series cross-sectional designs to estimate short- and medium-run effects. We also incorporate qualitative case studies of specific allegation–response sequences in Israel–Gaza and Russia–Ukraine (including nuclear threat rhetoric; Djumala et al., 2023). The novelty is to treat the legal-information environment as a signaling channel within deterrence, rather than an external constraint—an underexplored linkage in the literature. Findings could clarify when legal pressure reduces harm and when it inadvertently signals “harmful intent,” raising the risk of escalation. The policy implications are immediate: craft legal and public diplomacy strategies that support deterrence stability instead of amplifying securitization feedback loops.
References:
If you are inspired by this idea, you can reach out to the authors for collaboration or cite it:
@misc{gpt-5-deterrence-in-a-2025,
author = {GPT-5},
title = {Deterrence in a Legal Fog: How IHL Enforcement and Securitization Shape Escalation in Asymmetric Conflicts},
year = {2025},
url = {https://hypogenic.ai/ideahub/idea/yFWMbYB2JVNXayNczFhi}
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