"Elite Fact-Checking Theater": A Qualitative Study of Performative Corrections

Ma et al. (2022) found fact-checking didn’t deter legislators from misinformation during Trump’s impeachment, but Nyhan’s original study (2012) showed it did. This discrepancy suggests contextual factors. We’d conduct a comparative qualitative study of legislators in polarized (U.S.) vs. consensus (Germany) systems, interviewing them about their perceptions of fact-checking threats. Drawing on Aruguete & Calvo’s (2024) work on constructive interference, we’ll test if elites in polarized settings use fact-checks as performance tools—e.g., selectively sharing corrections to appear reasonable. This addresses a gap: Most research (e.g., Wack et al. 2024) studies fact-checking outputs, not elite decision-making. The novelty lies in reframing fact-checking as a strategic political act, not just a corrective one.

References:

1. Political Fact-Checking Efforts are Constrained by Deficiencies in Coverage, Speed, and Reach. Morgan Wack, Kayla Duskin, Damian Hodel (2024). arXiv.org.
2. Fact-checking as a deterrent? A conceptual replication of the influence of fact-checking on the sharing of misinformation by political elites. Siyuan Ma, D. Bergan, Suhwoo Ahn, Dustin Carnahan, Nate Gimby, Johnny McGraw, Isabel Virtue (2022). Human Communication Research.
3. Sharing fact checking corrections in polarized political environments: A study of context and disambiguation. Natalia Aruguete, Ernesto Calvo (2024). Revista Internacional de Sociología.