From Public Fear to State Resolve: Micro–Macro Feedback Loops in Deterrence Crises

Tu, Tien, and Hwang (2024) show that perceived power differentials and harmful intent strongly predict threat perception, while Asadzade (2025) finds that acute external shocks (the April 2024 Iran–Israel confrontation) significantly increase support for nuclear acquisition among citizens. Building on these, this project proposes a micro–macro model of deterrence credibility in which leaders anticipate and respond to rapidly changing public threat perceptions. The research would field real-time panel surveys and survey experiments in multiple countries during live crises (e.g., a Taiwan Strait flare-up, Iran–Israel tit-for-tat, or Russia–NATO incidents), manipulating perceptions of adversary power and intent, while tracking elite signaling and crisis dynamics via event data. It extends Haynes (2024) by reframing “audience costs” as endogenous to dynamic mass threat perceptions rather than static public hawkishness. The novelty is a causal chain from micro-level affective shifts to macro-level resolve and back (e.g., escalatory rhetoric inflating perceived intent). If successful, we would identify conditions under which leaders are “entrapped” by public spikes in fear or demand for punishment, clarifying when deterrent signals become less credible or dangerously escalatory. This unifies disparate findings on public opinion, deterrence signaling, and escalation, and offers practical guidance on communication strategies that stabilize rather than inflame crises.

References:

1. Untangling threat perception in international relations: an empirical analysis of threats posed by China and their implications for security discourse. Chang-Ching Tu, Han-Ping Tien, Ji-Jen Hwang (2024). Cogent Arts & Humanities.
2. Arms Transfers and Extended Deterrence. Kyle Haynes (2024). Journal of Politics.
3. External Threat and Nuclear Preferences: Micro-Level Insights from the Iran–Israel Confrontation. Peyman Asadzade (2025). Foreign Policy Analysis.