Beyond Weak Strategy-Proofness: Dynamic Coalitional Manipulation in Realistic Social Networks

Carlstein (2020) and Dasgupta & Maskin (2020) formalize weak strategy-proofness, but assume abstract, static coalitions. In reality, social networks (online and offline) allow coalitions to form and dissolve dynamically, with manipulation strategies evolving through communication and information cascades. This idea proposes to integrate social network theory and game-theoretic models of coalition formation into the analysis of strategy-proofness. Simulate voting under various rules on empirical or synthetic social graphs, allowing for realistic coalition-building and communication. Track not just whether manipulation is theoretically possible, but how, when, and by whom it emerges. This diverges from current literature by focusing on the process of manipulation (not just its theoretical existence), offering new insights into resilience and the design of voting systems that are robust to “networked” manipulation.

References:

1. Exploring Weak Strategy-Proofness in Voting Theory. Anne Carlstein (2020).
2. Exploring Weak Strategy-Proofness in Voting Theory. Anne Carlstein (2020).
3. Strategy-Proofness, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and Majority Rule. P. Dasgupta, E. Maskin (2020). American Economic Review: Insights.