Multi-Sender Signaling with Conflicting Objectives: A Conflict-Based Synthesis

Velicheti et al. (2023) show that multiple senders with different objectives can lead to non-unique equilibria, sometimes benefiting receivers. This idea pushes further: systematically study settings with two or more senders, each with distinct (possibly adversarial) objectives, and explore how their strategic interplay shapes the information transmitted and the induced equilibria. Can mechanism designers intentionally structure conflicts among senders to improve informativeness or social welfare? How does this compare to single-sender or aligned-objective models? This line of inquiry could synthesize conflicting results in the literature—some suggest conflicts help, others harm, informativeness—and propose new theoretical frameworks or solution concepts (e.g., "conflict-induced revelation"). The insights could be especially relevant in media, political, or cybersecurity contexts, where multiple information sources compete to sway decision-makers.

References:

1. Strategic Information Design in Quadratic Multidimensional Persuasion Games with Two Senders. R. K. Velicheti, Melih Bastopcu, T. Başar (2023). American Control Conference.