Reflexive Systemism: A Graphical-Computational Toolkit for Diagnosing Deterrence Failure

Lees (2023) highlights Patrick James’s call for a systemist, mechanism-rich reconstruction of realism, diagramming macro–micro causal pathways. Kalashlinska (2024) adapts Reflexive Game Theory (RGT) to mediation by targeting second-order beliefs—how actors think others perceive them. Deterrence crises are rife with reflexive misperceptions (e.g., Israel–Hezbollah’s post-2006 “rules of the game,” Sobelman, 2017; Russia’s nuclear signaling during Ukraine, Djumala et al., 2023). This project builds a graphical-computational framework—“Reflexive Systemism”—to specify macro–macro (alliances, arms), micro–micro (operational incidents), and the reflexive micro–macro loops (audiences, reputations, second-order beliefs) that push systems toward deterrence failure or stability. We would code crisis chronologies into causal graphs and simulate counterfactual signaling sequences (e.g., altering messages aimed at adversary self-perceptions vs. messages about how we perceive their perceptions, per RGT). The novelty is methodological: turning conceptual diagrams into testable, computationally tractable models that diagnose precisely which reflexive links are brittle. The payoff is prescriptive: crisis communications and posture adjustments tailored to the vulnerable links, potentially preventing escalation spirals of the sort identified around NATO’s northern flank security dilemma (Bogdanov & Stefanovich, 2024).

References:

1. Patrick James, Realism and international relations: a graphic turn toward scientific progress. Nicholas Lees (2023). Cambridge Review of International Affairs.
2. Applying Reflexive Game Theory to Mediation: New Strategies for Conflict Resolution. Maryna Kalashlinska (2024). European Political and Law Discourse.
3. Learning to Deter: Deterrence Failure and Success in the Israel-Hezbollah Conflict, 2006–16. Daniel Sobelman (2017). International Security.
4. On the Security Dilemma and Threats of Escalation in the Context of Finland’s and Sweden’s Joining to NATO. K. Bogdanov, D. Stefanovich (2024). Comparative Politics Russia.
5. CONSTRUING THE NUCLEAR THREAT: The Relevance of Deterrence Theory in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict. Darmansjah Djumala, Arry Bainus, R. Widya Setiabudi Sumadinata, Yusa Djuyandi (2023). Journal of Namibian Studies: History Politics Culture.