When Authoritarians Go Mixed: The Paradoxical Consequences of Electoral System Engineering in Hybrid Regimes

Usova (2024) and Moser (2001) both highlight that mixed electoral systems can have counterintuitive effects, particularly in authoritarian or transitional contexts. This idea would systematically track the introduction of mixed systems across hybrid regimes, using both quantitative (cross-national event history analysis) and qualitative (case studies) methods to map not only the elite incentives but also the unanticipated outcomes—such as party proliferation or enhanced opposition coordination. The novelty lies in connecting the strategic motivations for adopting these systems with long-term regime stability and the capacity of opposition forces to exploit institutional loopholes. This could generate new theory about the life-cycle of electoral authoritarianism and the limits of institutional engineering.

References:

1. Unexpected Outcomes. R. Moser (2001).
2. Mixed Parallel Electoral System — Optimal Choice under Authoritarianism? (Cross-National Comparative Study). V. А. Usova (2024). The Journal of Political Theory, Political Philosophy and Sociology of Politics Politeia.