Game-Theoretic Analysis of Voting Blocs in Non-Anonymous and Federated Elections

Building on Gendler (2024) and the observation that real-world elections often feature influential blocs (parties, districts, identity groups), this idea proposes explicitly modeling how such coalitions form and the extent to which they can manipulate or dominate outcomes under both Condorcet and Borda rules. While past work focuses on individual rationality and anonymity, little has been done to rigorously model coalition dynamics and their consequences for fairness, efficiency, and representation—particularly when anonymity is relaxed. By adapting tools from cooperative game theory (e.g., Shapley value, core stability) and network analysis, this research could reveal under what conditions bloc dynamics enhance or undermine democratic ideals, and which voting rules are most robust to bloc manipulation in federated systems.

References:

1. Condorcet cycle elections with influential voting blocs. Gabriel Gendler (2024).
2. Condorcet cycle elections with influential voting blocs. Gabriel Gendler (2024).
3. Condorcet cycle elections with influential voting blocs. Gabriel Gendler (2024).